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Technology (i.e. tools, methods of cultivation and domestication, systems of construction and
appropriation, machines) has increased the vital rates of humans, and is one of the defining features of
the transition from Malthusian ecological stagnation to a potentially perpetual rising population
growth. Maladaptations, on the other hand, encompass behaviours, customs and practices that decrease
the vital rates of individuals. Technology and maladaptations are part of the total stock of culture carried
by the individuals in a population. Here, we develop a quantitative model for the coevolution of
cumulative adaptive technology and maladaptive culture in a ‘producer–scrounger’ game, which can
also usefully be interpreted as an ‘individual–social’ learner interaction. Producers (individual learners)
are assumed to invent new adaptations and maladaptations by trial-and-error learning, insight or
deduction, and they pay the cost of innovation. Scroungers (social learners) are assumed to copy or
imitate (cultural transmission) both the adaptations and maladaptations generated by producers. We
show that the coevolutionary dynamics of producers and scroungers in the presence of cultural trans-
mission can have a variety of effects on population carrying capacity. From stable polymorphism,
where scroungers bring an advantage to the population (increase in carrying capacity), to periodic
cycling, where scroungers decrease carrying capacity, we find that selection-driven cultural innovation
and transmission may send a population on the path of indefinite growth or to extinction.
Keywords: producer–scrounger game; technology; adaptation; maladaptation;
individual and social learning; cyclic dynamics
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last million years, the human lineage has learned to
transform natural resources into technology; that is, tools,
methods of cultivation and domestication, systems of
construction and appropriation, machines and modes of
social organization. From Oldowan stone tools to steam
engines to genetic research, humans have mastered technol-
ogy to the point of being able to leave the surface of the Earth
and explore outer space. Technology is also the basis of
economic growth (Solow 1956; Galor & Weil 2000; Romer
2006); without technological innovations, the human
population would probably have reached a stable size long
ago (Kremer 1993). Technology is thus one of the defining
features of the transition fromMalthusian ecological stagna-
tion to potentially continuous economic and population
growth (Galor & Weil 2000; Galor & Moav 2002).
Technology can be interpreted as being a non-rival
good: in economics, a good is considered to be non-
rival if its consumption or use by one individual makes
its use by anyone else no less difficult (Pindyck &
Rubinfeld 2001). For instance, the control of fire by
one individual does not in itself make its use by another
individual more problematic. By contrast, one individ-
ual’s consumption of some natural resources, such as a
chunk of meat or a piece of wood for the fire, does prevent
the use of those resources by another individual (unless
people expand resources, consumption of natural
resources tends to be a zero-sum game: the gain or loss
by one individual is balanced by the losses or gains to
others). Before the advent of modern societies, technol-
ogy was probably also a non-excludable good: a good is
considered to be non-excludable if its use by one individ-
ual who has not paid for it is ineluctable (Pindyck &
Rubinfeld 2001). The invention of the wheel certainly
took the inventor some time and effort, but later use of
wheels by others would have been difficult to prevent.
Goods that are both non-rival and non-excludable are
called public goods (Pindyck & Rubinfeld 2001).
For most of human evolution, technology was prob-
ably a public good. The technology produced by one
individual could easily be copied and used by others in
the population. Because technology is probably costlier
to produce, in terms of time and energy, than to copy
or imitate, the interaction between the individuals in a
population producing and using technology can be
regarded as a ‘producer–scrounger’ game. In this game,
the individuals of one type (the scroungers) make use of
the behavioural investment of individuals of another
type, the producers (Barnard & Sibly 1981; Giraldeau
et al. 1994). Because scroungers might copy the technol-
ogy developed by producers, the interaction between the
two types can also usefully be regarded as an ‘individual–
social’ learner interaction. Here, the individuals of one
type (the social learners) copy or imitate the behaviours
or artefacts that have been generated by the other type
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(the individual learners) through trial-and-error learning,
insight or deduction (Rogers 1988; Stephens 1991;
Boyd & Richerson 1995; Wakano et al. 2004; Enquist &
Ghirlanda 2007). The evolution of technology (and the
origins of economic growth) can thus be framed in
terms of the producer–scrounger game, as well as in
terms of the coevolution of individual learning and cul-
tural transmission, in which technology can be regarded
as a suite of cultural practices.
Throughout human evolution, technology is also likely
to have increased the vital rates of individuals; that is, it is
adaptive. But technology may become maladaptive, and
decrease the vital rates of individuals using it. For
instance, agricultural practices, such as the clearing of
land and irrigation, which increased productivity, might
also have brought increased contact between human
populations and animal reservoirs of disease such as
schistosomiasis and malaria, which raised the mortality
rate of the resident population (Livingstone 1958;
Huang & Manderson 1993). Instead of traditional
earthen pits, Alaskan natives now often use plastic bags
as food containers. These allow the growth of botulism
bacteria, which increase the rate of death owing to botu-
lism (Lancaster 1990). The collection of cultural
practices carried by the individuals in a population,
therefore, may involve both adaptive and maladaptive
components (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Diamond 2005;
Enquist & Ghirlanda 2007). We may thus postulate that
producers of technology (individual learners) not only
produce adaptive cultural traits but, as a by-product,
may generate maladaptive traits, which may be copied
or imitated by scroungers (social learners).
The impact of adaptive and maladaptative cultural
traits on human evolution has been repeatedly stressed
(Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1981; Lumsden & Wilson
1981; Boyd & Richerson 1985; Richerson & Boyd
2005), but its cumulative nature has virtually never
been taken into account explicitly in evolutionary
models of cultural transmission. Further, the feedback
of cultural adaptations and maladaptations on population
dynamics is also very likely to have affected human demo-
graphy (Tainter 1988; Diamond 1997, 2005), but this
also has rarely been analysed in an evolutionary context.
There is a clear lack of quantitative theory in this area
and a need to gain better understanding of how the evol-
utionary dynamics drive the accumulation of culture, and
how this feeds back on population demography.
This gap has started to be filled with the construction
of macro-level models for cumulative cultural dynamics
(Enquist & Ghirlanda 2007; Ghirlanda & Enquist
2007; Enquist et al. 2008). Here, we pursue this line of
research but focus on micro-level, individual actions,
and explore the coevolution of technological innovation,
by-product maladaptation and population growth under
producer–scrounger game dynamics.
2. MODEL
(a) Biological setting
We consider a panmictic population of large enough size
to ignore the stochastic effects introduced by finite
population size. We assume that the amount of resources
available to an individual to produce offspring in this
population depends on the amount of adaptive and
maladaptive cultural traits he/she expresses. Cultural
adaptations (also referred to as adaptive technology)
encompass such items as techniques to build arrows, a
list of poisonous foods, irrigation methods and any
other knowledge involved in hunting, gathering and culti-
vation of resources that may increase the amount of
resources available to an individual. Maladaptations, on
the other hand, represent behaviours, customs or mystical
beliefs that reduce the amount of resources invested into
vital rates.
We assume that there are three types of individuals in
the population. The first are innates: these are individuals
who express no cultural traits (neither adaptations nor
maladaptations). The second are producers (individual
learners), namely those individuals that use adaptive
technology and will augment its stock by trial-and-error
learning, insight or deduction. In so doing, producers
are also likely to generate maladaptive behaviours.
In other words, producers augment both the stock of
adaptive and maladaptive culture, and pay a fitness
cost ci for it. The third type are scroungers (social
learners), who copy or imitate the cultural traits invented
by producers. The strategies of the three types of
individuals—innates, producers and scroungers—can be
interpreted here as being either genetically or culturally
determined; in any case, we consider that the inheritance
of these strategies occurs vertically from parent to
offspring.
The events of the life cycle of individuals in the popu-
lation unfold in the following order. (i) Reproduction
occurs with the number of offspring produced by an
individual depending on the amount of resources he/she
has gathered and that they are not diverted into expres-
sing maladaptations. (ii) Offspring grow and develop.
Juveniles are subject to an enculturation period during
which producers and scroungers acquire and assimilate
adaptive and maladaptive cultural items from the
individuals of the parental population, either by vertical
transmission, with probability v, or by oblique
transmission, with complementary probability 1 2 v.
(iii) Juveniles become adults and produce resources.
Innates spend all their time producing resources. Produ-
cers spend a fraction zi of their time inventing new
adaptive technology (during which they might also pro-
duce maladaptations) and a complementary fraction
12 zi of their units of time producing resources. Scroun-
gers spend a fraction zs of their time scrounging, during
which they imitate both adaptive and maladaptive
practices developed by producers, and a complementary
fraction 12 zs of their time producing resources.
(b) Population dynamics
The fitness of an individual is defined here as the
expected number of its offspring that reach the stage of
reproduction. We assume that this is an increasing,
linear function of the total amount of resources available
to him/her (introducing diminishing returns does not
change the qualitative results reported here). We suppose
that individuals are endowed with two factors of pro-
duction allowing them to produce resources: land and
labour. The number of units of land available to an
individual is assumed to decrease with total population
size N (negative density-dependent competition), with
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the effective units of land available to him/her being given
by 1/(1 þ hN), where h measures the strength of density-
dependent competition (0 " h"1). Hence, in the
absence of density dependence (h ¼ 0), each individual
is endowed with one baseline unit of land, and the
functional form of density dependence follows the
standard Beverton–Holt model from ecology (discrete-
time analogue of the logistic model; Begon et al. 1996;
Bra¨nnstro¨m & Sumpter 2005).
Each individual is also endowed with one baseline unit
of labour, which is decreased by the time spent producing
cultural items (or scrounging) and augmented by its level
of adaptive technology, with the effective units of labour
being assumed to be given by the multiplicative form
(1 þ A)(1 2 z), where A is the stock of adaptations and
(1 2 z) is the fraction of time spent in labour. Hence,
an innate (A ¼ 0 and z ¼ 0) is endowed with one baseline
unit of labour. We assume that effective units of land and
effective units of labour combine also multiplicatively
to give the total amount of resources (1 þ A)(1 2 z)/
(1 þ hN) available to an individual. With the above
assumptions, the production of resources follows the stan-
dard Cobb–Douglas model from economics with unit
exponent (Cobb & Douglas 1928; Pindyck & Rubinfeld
2001; Romer 2006); with exponential components
for the production function, i.e. with functional form
(1 þ A)g1 (1 2 z)g2/(1 þ hN)g3, the main qualitative
results reported here do not change. The main motivation
behind adopting the above simplifying assumptions is to
make the model analytically tractable by using
well-established functional forms.
Having specified the functional relationships that map
factors of production into resource availability, it remains
to specify how the benefits of producing resources, the
cost ci to producers, and the cost of expressing maladap-
tations affect fitness.Two main possibilities are usually
considered in evolutionary biology: additive and multi-
plicative effects of costs and benefits on fitness. We
investigated these two cases, but present only the additive
case in the main text as it turns out to be analytically more
tractable, which makes it easier to develop intuitions
about the dynamics of the system. Introducing multiplica-
tive effects does not change the qualitative results
reported here (electronic supplementary material).
With our assumptions, the fitness of an innate at time t
is given by
wg;t ¼ a
1þ hNt ; ð2:1Þ
where a is a scaling factor converting the amount
of resources available to an individual into offspring
production, and can be thought of as the maximum rate
of offspring production with one unit of resource
(0 " a"1). The fitness of a producer is
wi;t ¼ a ð1þ Ai;tÞð1& ziÞ
1þ hNt & cMMi;t & ci
! "
; ð2:2Þ
where Ai,t is the stock of adaptations used by a producer at
time t; cM is a scaling factor, which converts maladapta-
tions into a decrease in the amount of resources used in
offspring production (0 " cM "1); and Mi,t is the
amount of maladaptations carried by a producer at time t.
The net cost of expressing maladaptations is thus given
by cM Mi,t. Finally, ci is the fitness cost of being a producer
relative to being a scrounger (see equation (A 1) in
electronic supplementary material for the multiplicative
version of the fitness function). The fitness of a
scrounger is
ws;t ¼ a ð1þ As;tÞð1& zsÞ
1þ hNt & cMMs;t
! "
; ð2:3Þ
where As,t is the stock of adaptations used by a scrounger
at time t andMs,t is the stock of maladaptations carried by
him/her (see equation (A 2) in the electronic supplemen-
tary material for the multiplicative version of the fitness
function).
Notice that these fitness functions (equations (2.1)–
(2.3)) entail, first, that being a producer has a fitness
cost relative to being a scrounger, and, second, that
both producing and scrounging are costly relative to
being a innate (in the absence of stocks of cultures)
because producers and scroungers spend less time
extracting resources. For this reason and for simplicity,
we did not introduce an additional cost to scroungers (a
parameter cs, which would parallel ci, where both can be
thought of as the costs of plasticity, or of the physiological
mechanisms that allow invention and imitation) as this
will not change the main qualitative results reported
here, although adding such a cost would make the
model biologically more realistic.
With the fitness functions, we can obtain the frequency
pt (qt) of producers (scroungers) in the population at
time t by evaluating the ratio of the number of their off-
spring to the total number of offspring in the population as
ptþ1 ¼ wi;tpt!wt ; ð2:4Þ
and
qtþ1 ¼ ws;tqt!wt ; ð2:5Þ
where
!wt ¼ ð1& pt & qtÞwg;t þ ptwi;t þ qtws;t ð2:6Þ
is the mean fitness in the population. From this equation,
we obtain the total population size in the next-time
generation as
Ntþ1 ¼ !wtNt : ð2:7Þ
In the absence of producers and scroungers, pt ¼ qt ¼ 0
for all t, the population is monomorphic for innates.
Then, from equations (2.1), (2.6) and (2.7), and if
a . 1 and h . 0, population size converges to the stable
value (carrying capacity)
N^ ¼ a& 1
h
; ð2:8Þ
where throughout the paper the caret denotes an
equilibrium value.
(c) Adaptation dynamics
We now present expressions for the dynamics of adaptive
technology used by producers (Ai,t) and scroungers (As,t).
In order to obtain these expressions, we denote by
At ¼ ptAi;t þ qtAs;t ð2:9Þ
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the stock of adaptations used by an individual sampled at
random from the population at time t (average stock of
adaptations).
The stock of adaptations used by a producer consists
of two parts. First, a producer living at time t acquires
adaptations from the individuals of the parental gener-
ation (stage 2 of the life cycle). With probability v, it
copies its parent and otherwise copies an individual
sampled at random from the parental population, and
then acquires an amount At21 of adaptations (see
equation (2.9)). Second, a producer living at time t gen-
erates an amount IA,t of adaptations by itself, which is
the per capita rate of adaptive technological innovation.
As a result, the stock of adaptations used by a producer
at time t is
Ai;t ¼ ð1& eAÞ½vAi;t&1 þ ð1& vÞAt&1( þ IA;t ; ð2:10Þ
where eA is an exogenous decay rate of adaptations (0 "
eA " 1). This parameter can be interpreted as the rate
of obsolescence of adaptive technology from one gener-
ation to the next (for instance, because the exogenous
environment changes), as an error rate in copying adap-
tations from the parental generation or even as a pure
loss of knowledge owing to lack of memory if the
system of knowledge (e.g. list of poisonous food) is
mainly stored in peoples’ heads (for simplicity, we do
not consider an endogenous decay rate).
As was the case for a producer, we assume that the stock
of adaptations used by a scrounger at time t consists of two
parts. First, a scrounger living at time t acquires cultural
traits from the parental generation by vertical and/or by
oblique transmission. Second, a scrounger may scrounge
on the total stock ptNtIA,t of adaptations generated at
time t by all producers in the population. Then, the
stock of adaptations used by a scrounger at time t is
As;t ¼ ð1& eAÞ½vAs;t&1 þ ð1& vÞAt&1(
þ zsbAptNtIA;t ; ð2:11Þ
where bA is a transmission parameter (0" bA " 1), which
can be interpreted as the contact rate between producers
and scroungers multiplied by the probability of
transmission of cultural items from producers to scroun-
gers. The transmission probability may depend on the con-
cealment of traits by producers or the degree of
excludability of adaptations. If adaptations become more
excludable, then bA decreases and complete excludability
would correspond to bA ¼ 0. Equation (2.11) entails that
a scrounger may assimilate the adaptations of several
different individuals, and implicit in the use of ptNtIA,t is
the assumption that the adaptations expressed indepen-
dently by different producers can be combined additively.
We found no micro-foundations in the economics or cul-
tural evolution literature to justify any particular functional
form for the aggregation of cultural items. Thus, additive
aggregation is the natural starting point as it is the most
analytically tractable.
Finally, we need an expression for IA,t, which we
assume takes the form
IA;t ¼ zi½mð1& xÞ þ wAfvAi;t&1 þ ð1& vÞAt&1g(; ð2:12Þ
where m is the rate of innovation per unit time invested
into learning, which is independent of the adaptations
acquired from the parental generation (0 " m"1), and
x is the fraction of these innovations that are maladaptive.
The parameter wA is a rate of innovation, which converts
existing adaptations into new ones (0 " wA "1).
The parametrization in equations (2.10) and (2.12),
where the existing adaptive technology decays exogen-
ously (at rate eA), and new technology is created de
novo (at rate m (1 2 x) per unit investment) and from
the existing adaptive technology (at rate wA), follows the
work of Enquist & Ghirlanda (2007, equations (8)
and (9)) and Enquist et al. (2008, equation (18)), who
developed macroscopic models for the dynamics of
adaptations and maladaptations aimed at fitting the
empirical data. We mention that economists endorse
quite similar assumptions for the dynamics of technology
(e.g. Galor & Weil 2000; Romer 2006), but tend to expo-
nentiate the existing technology, which does not alter the
main qualitative results reported here.
(d) Maladaptation dynamics
Here, we present expressions for the amount of maladap-
tations carried by producers (Mi,t) and scroungers (Ms,t)
in the population. Similar to the average stock of adap-
tations introduced above (equation (2.9)), we denote by
Mt ¼ ptMi;t þ qtMs;t ð2:13Þ
the stock of maladaptations carried by an individual
sampled at random from the population at time t (average
maladaptation).
As was the case for adaptations, we assume that the
stock of maladaptations carried by a producer consists
of two parts. First, an individual acquires maladaptations
from individuals of the parental generation by vertical
and/or oblique transmission. Second, producers develop
IM,t new maladaptations during generation t. Combining
these, the stock of maladaptations used by a producer at
time t is
Mi;t ¼ ð1& eMÞ½vMi;t&1 þ ð1& vÞMt&1( þ IM;t ; ð2:14Þ
where eM is a decay rate of maladaptations, which can be
interpreted as the rate of loss of maladaptations owing to
errors in copying exemplar individuals or selective filter-
ing through a higher probability of adopting adaptive
rather than maladaptive cultural traits (Enquist &
Ghirlanda 2007). In addition to inheriting maladapta-
tions from the parental generation, scroungers are
assumed to copy them from the total stock ptNtIM,t of
maladaptations generated at time t by all producers in
the population. The stock of maladaptations used by a
scrounger at time t is then given by
Ms;t ¼ ð1& eMÞ½vMs;t&1 þ ð1& vÞMt&1(
þ zsbMptNtIM;t; ð2:15Þ
where bM is the transmission rate of maladaptations from
producers to scroungers (0 " bM " 1), which can be
thought of as the contact rate between producers and
scroungers multiplied by the per-individual transmission
rate of maladaptations from producers to scroungers.
Finally, the amount of maladaptations developed by a
producer in generation t is assumed to be given by
IM;t ¼ zi½mxþ wMfvMi;t&1 þ ð1& vÞMt&1g(; ð2:16Þ
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where wM is the rate of conversion of existing maladapta-
tions into new ones. In equation (2.16), we ignore, for
simplicity, the possibility that existing adaptations may
generate new maladaptations (again, adding such a
feature does not alter the main qualitative results
reported here).
Our model tracks the nonlinear dynamical system
characterized by the variables pt, qt, Nt, Ai,t, As,t, Mi,t,
Ms,t (equations (2.4), (2.5), (2.7), (2.10), (2.11), (2.14)
and (2.15), respectively) and allows us to track the
dynamics of pt, qt, Nt, At and Mt, which eventually
converge to some equilibrium point given by pˆ, qˆ, Nˆ, Aˆ
and Mˆ. Depending on the parameter values, this system
can be complicated, and we studied its dynamics and
equilibrium points using analytical expressions when we
were able to derive them (or when they are not too
complicated), and used numerical analysis for the
more complicated cases.
3. RESULTS
(a) Adaptations without maladaptations
In this section, we present results for the case where there
are no maladaptations (x ¼ 0, wM ¼ 0 and M0 ¼ 0) so
that only the dynamics of pt, qt, Nt and At are involved.
If we further assume that the investments into producing
and scrounging are the same (zi ¼ zs ¼ z) and that there is
no cost to individual learning (ci ¼ 0), the analysis simpli-
fies considerably. In the absence of scroungers (q0 ¼ 0), a
small fraction of producers (p0! 0) will invade a popu-
lation of innates if wi,t . wg,t, where the fitnesses are
evaluated at the demographic equilibrium of the innates
(equation (2.8)). That is, producers invade if (1 þ zm)
(1 2 z) . 1, which reflects a trade-off between the gains
from inventing new adaptive technology (first parenth-
eses) and the loss of productivity incurred from spending
time inventing technology (second parentheses). By
rearranging, the gains outweigh the losses when
m .
1
1& z ; ð3:1Þ
where the parameters eA and wA do not affect this
invasion condition because the stock of the adaptive tech-
nology of the parental generation is initially set to zero (no
producers and no scroungers in the parental generation).
If the condition for invasion by producers is satisfied, it
can also be shown that producers will not only spread
when rare but will also go to fixation in the population,
in which case pˆ ¼ 1. This occurs because the fitness of
producers will be higher than that of innates at all fre-
quencies of innates in the population (the accumulation
of adaptations can only further increase the fitness of
producers relative to that of innates). If the invasion
condition is not satisfied, the producers will be expelled
from the population, in which case pˆ ¼ 0. Therefore,
no polymorphism can be maintained in the population
in the long run, and it will be fixed either for innates
( pˆ ¼ 0) or for producers ( pˆ ¼ 1). In the latter event,
we find from equations (2.7), (2.10) and (2.12) that the
carrying capacity is given by
N^ ¼ 1
h
að1& zÞð1þ A^Þ & 1
# $
; ð3:2Þ
where the equilibrium level Aˆ of average adaptations is
A^ ¼ zm
eA & zwA
: ð3:3Þ
By generating Aˆ, producers thus increase the carrying
capacity; that is, they bring an advantage to the popu-
lation (compare equation (3.2) with (2.8)). Note that
the intensity of vertical transmission, v, does not appear
in equations (3.2) and (3.3), and thus has no effect on
equilibrium values; it only affects the rate of convergence
to equilibrium. For ease of presentation, we set v ¼ 0 in
the rest of the paper; that is, juveniles copy only an indi-
vidual sampled at random from the population (the value
of v does not affect any of the analytical equilibrium
points reported in this paper nor does it affect the quali-
tative properties of the non-equilibrium dynamics
reported below).
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) show that, given values of h,
m and z, the stable population size will be mainly affected
by the difference eA2 zwA between the exogenous decay
rate eA and the endogenous growth rate zwA of existing
adaptations. As this difference goes to zero, both the
level of cultural adaptations and population size
approaches infinity. Hence, a theoretical possibility is
Marquis de Condorcet’s view that cogitation (m and wA)
will remove any obstacle to technological improvement
and break the Malthusian iron limit. This is a classical
result from macroeconomic theory (Kremer 1993;
Romer 2006) and termed the ‘demo-cultural explosion’
by Ghirlanda & Enquist (2007).
Introducing scroungers into a population fixed for pro-
ducers ( pˆ ¼ 1) results in invasion by scroungers and in a
unique stable polymorphism between producers and
scroungers, characterized by
p^ ¼ 1
zbAN^
; ð3:4Þ
where Nˆ is given by equation (3.2). Thus, pˆ varies inver-
sely with the rate of transmission bA of adaptations to
scroungers and with Nˆ, but, crucially, neither Nˆ nor Aˆ
is affected by bA and the frequency of scroungers. If
zi ¼ zs ¼ z and ci ¼ 0, scrounging has no effect on popu-
lation carrying capacity: it brings neither an advantage
nor a disadvantage to the population. This feature is
illustrated in figure 1, where producers first invade a
population of innates, then go to fixation and are sub-
sequently invaded by scroungers, whose presence does
not perturb the equilibrium population size.
The equilibrium level of adaptive technology and
population size are not affected by the presence of scroun-
gers nor the transmission rate bA because scroungers
aggregate adaptations from several different producers
in the population in a given generation (the term
bAptNt in equation (2.11)), and then pass it to the next
generation. An increase in the transmission rate bA
decreases the selective pressure on producers, whose
frequency then decreases in the population. But the con-
comitant decrease in the average stock of adaptations
inherited from the parental generation will then be
compensated by an increase in their aggregation by
scroungers (higher bA value). Thus, at equilibrium, the
same amount of adaptations can be maintained with
fewer individuals producing it. This accords with previous
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studies that identified several situations where cultural
transmission does not increase population fitness even if
it is selected (Rogers 1988; Stephens 1991; Boyd &
Richerson 1995; Wakano et al. 2004; Enquist &
Ghirlanda 2007). In the electronic supplementary
material we analyse how varying both the cost of produ-
cing and the proportion of time spent producing relative
to that spent scrounging affect the equilibrium point of
the dynamical system just discussed.
(b) Adaptations with maladaptations
We now allow maladaptations to affect the coevolutionary
dynamics of producers and scroungers, and analyse the
dynamics of pt, qt, Nt, At and Mt.
(i) Analytical results
Again we start by assuming that zi ¼ zs ¼ z and ci ¼ 0,
and further that eA ¼ eM ¼ e (rates of obsolescence of
adaptations equals the rate of loss of maladaptations),
wA ¼ wM ¼ 0 (rate of growth of adaptations and maladap-
tations do not depend on past adaptations), and that
bA ¼ bM ¼ b (the rate of transfer of adaptations and
maladaptations from producers to scroungers is the same).
In the absence of scroungers, a small fraction of producers
may invade a population of innates if wi,t. wg,t at the
demographic equilibrium of the innates (equation (2.8));
this occurs if (1 þ z (12 x)m)(12 z)2 zmxcM. 1,
which reflects a trade-off between the gains from inventing
a new adaptive technology (first parentheses of the first
term) and two types of costs: loss of productivity incurred
by spending time inventing cultural traits (second parenth-
eses of the first term) and cost owing to expressing
maladaptations. The gains outweigh the losses when
m .
1
ð1& zÞð1& xÞ & xcM : ð3:5Þ
Note that e does not affect this invasion condition
because the level of adaptations and maladaptations in
the parental generation is initially set to zero (no producers
and no scroungers in the parental generation).
The main qualitative difference between equation
(3.5) and the invasion condition without maladaptations
(equation (3.1)) is the cost owing to generating mala-
daptations, which decreases the selective advantage of
producers. If the invasion condition is satisfied, it can
again be shown that the fitness of producers will be
higher than that of innates at all frequencies of innates
in the population, so that producers will go to fixation
in the population. In this event we have pˆ ¼ 1 and,
from equations (2.7), (2.10), (2.12), (2.14) and (2.16),
fixation of producers results in the carrying capacity
being given by
N^ ¼ 1
h
að1& zÞð1þ A^Þ
1þ acMM^
& 1
 !
; ð3:6Þ
where
A^ ¼ zmð1& xÞ
e
ð3:7Þ
and
M^ ¼ zmx
e
: ð3:8Þ
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(a)
(b)
(c)
pt, qt
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
Nt
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
t
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
At
qt
pt
Figure 1. Time dynamics of (a) the frequencies of producers
and scroungers (pt and qt), (b) population size (Nt) and (c)
average stock of adaptations (At), with equal scrounging
and producing time (zi ¼ zs ¼ z), no individual cost to pro-
ducers (ci ¼ 0) and no maladaptations (x ¼ 0, wM ¼ 0 and
M0 ¼ 0). Parameter values are a ¼ 3, h ¼ 0.001, e ¼ 0.1,
m ¼ 1.2, wA ¼ 0, bA ¼ 0.025 and z ¼ 0.05. We introduced
both producers and scroungers at low frequency in a popu-
lation of innates, and the initial variable values were set to
p0 ¼ 0.001, q0 ¼ 0.001, N0 ¼ 2000 (which is the carrying
capacity in a population of innates, equation (2.8)), Ai,0 ¼
IA,0 ¼ zim and As,0 ¼ zsbAIA,0 p0 N0. The figure illustrates
the typical time dynamics of the model: in the first period,
producers, pt, invade the population of innates and go to
quasi-fixation, which is followed by population size and
stock of adaptations reaching a steady state (t ¼ 650 to t ¼
1000). In the second period, scroungers, qt, then invade
the population of producers, after which population size
and adaptations go through a transitory peak, to finally reset-
tle at their steady-state values observed before the rise of
scroungers. These steady-state values, Nˆ ¼ 3560 and Aˆ ¼
0.6, are predicted by equations (3.2) and (3.3), and
they describe the equilibrium population size and stock of
adaptations regardless of the initial frequencies of scroungers.
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The main qualitative difference between equations
(3.2), (3.3) and equations (3.6)–(3.8) is that Nˆ is now
a decreasing function of the equilibrium average stock
Mˆ of maladaptations in the population.
Introducing scroungers into a population of producers
allows us again to find a unique stable polymorphism
between producers and scroungers, which is
characterized by
p^ ¼ 1
zbN^
; ð3:9Þ
where Nˆ is given by equation (3.6). Qualitatively, this is
the same result as equation (3.4). Quantitatively,
however, the presence of maladaptation increases the
equilibrium level of producers pˆ: increasing the rate of
production x of maladaptations and/or the cost cM of
maladaptations decreases Nˆ, which causes pˆ to increase.
Equations (3.6)–(3.9) show that when bA ¼ bM ¼ b,
the rate of transmission of cultural variants from produ-
cers to scroungers does not affect Aˆ and Mˆ, which is
the same result as we found without maladaptation. As
was the case for adaptations, this stems from the fact
that scroungers aggregate adaptations and maladaptations
from several different producers in the population (the
terms of the form bpt Nt in equations (2.11) and (2.15),
which are the same when bA ¼ bM ¼ b). At equilibrium,
the same amount of adaptations and maladaptations can
be maintained in the population with various combi-
nations of frequencies of producers and values of b.
But if the rates of transmission of adaptations and mala-
daptations from producers to scroungers are different
(bA= bM), then Aˆ and Mˆ will be affected by bA and
bM (see equations (A 4)–(A 6) of the electronic
supplementary material).
(ii) Numerical results
More generally, the rates of loss of adaptations and
maladaptations may be different (eA= eM) and the
appearance of new adaptations and maladaptations may
be dependent on the amount of existing cultural traits
(wA. 0 and wM . 0) or a combination of these factors.
In all these cases, and assuming no scroungers (q0 ¼ 0),
we find that either there is a stable polymorphism
between innates and producers or innates and producers
coexist in a stable periodic cycle (figure S4 in the
electronic supplementary material). Producers do not
fix in a population of innates when the increase in
fitness benefits brought by adaptations is balanced
by the fitness costs resulting from the expression of
maladaptations. Both fitness costs and benefits are
frequency-dependent, with the consequence that the
fitness of producers becomes equivalent to that of innates
(negative frequency dependence on producers) before
producers fix in the population. This will cause the carry-
ing capacity to be either the same as that determined by
innates (equation (2.8), if there is a stable polymorphism
between innates and producers) or result in periodic
cycling around this value (figure S4 in the electronic
supplementary material).
There is a large range of parameter values with eM. eA
or wM. wA, where periodic cycling of producers, adap-
tations, maladaptations and population size occurs (wA,
wM, eA, eM are so-called bifurcation parameters). This
follows from the following considerations. Initially, produ-
cers increase adaptive technology and invade the popu-
lation of innates (without enough maladaptations to
prevent the initial increase in producer frequency). Then,
maladaptations accumulate (for instance, if the rate of pro-
duction of new maladaptations is low, but their rate of
decay is not lower than that of adaptations: eA. eM), in
which case a calculable point is eventually reached where
the fitness of producers declines drastically, causing their
decrease in frequency, followed by a rapid decline in adap-
tations and subsequently of maladaptations (figure S4 in
the electronic supplementary material). This results in a
situation where the stock of maladaptations is again too
low to prevent the increase in the frequency of producers:
the cycle starts again.
Introducing scroungers into a population polymorphic
for innates and producers can result in coexistence
between the three types, either in a stable polymorphism
or in a periodic cycle (figure 2). As was observed in the
presence of maladaptations, the typical time dynamics
of the system when small fractions of producers and
scroungers are introduced into the population is that pro-
ducers invade first and are then invaded by scroungers,
with the population finally settling either at a stable
polymorphic equilibrium or into a state where the fre-
quencies of the three types oscillate periodically
(figure 2). We observed cycling under a large range of
parameter values, and there are situations where the
population size rises and falls sharply, possibly reaching
the point of extinction.
4. DISCUSSION
(a) Adaptations without maladaptations
Our results suggest that, in the absence of maladapta-
tions, producers are likely to invade a population of
innates and will then go to fixation, causing population
size to increase (equation (3.2) and figure 1). By allowing
individuals in the population to obtain more resources,
the benefits of adaptive technology may offset the cost
of innovation (loss of time devoted to labour) and
increase the vital rates of individuals. Scroungers may
then invade a population of producers with the conse-
quence that the population will approach a stable poly-
morphism (figure 1). Is adding scroungers advantageous
or disadvantageous to the population; that is, how does
cultural transmission affect population size? Our results
show that this is sensitive to the parameter values.
When producing has some intrinsic cost relative to
scrounging (ci . 0, equation (2.2)), adding scroungers
might actually undermine population productivity and
reduce equilibrium population size (figure S3 in the
electronic supplementary material). Here, cultural trans-
mission is detrimental to the population. In the absence
of costs, and with equal effort required for producing
and scrounging, the population size is not affected by
the presence of scroungers: the demographic conse-
quences of cultural transmission are neutral (figure 1),
although any frequency of scroungers can be maintained
at equilibrium by tuning the transmission parameter bA
(equation (3.4)). However, when scroungers put more
effort into scrounging than producers do into producing,
and everything else is held constant,scroungers may
greatly increase population size: here cultural
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transmission brings an advantage to the population
(figure S2 in the electronic supplementary material).
This occurs because scroungers aggregate the adaptive
technology of many different producers in the population,
thereby increasing the average level of adaptations, which
is then passed on to the next generations. Scroungers can
be regarded as fitness amplifiers in this case.
(b) Adaptations with maladaptations
Adding maladaptations (as by-products of adaptive tech-
nological innovation) markedly affects the coevolutionary
dynamics of innates, producers and scroungers. Qualitat-
ive changes in the dynamics occur in at least two different
ways. First, innates may coexist with producers at a stable
polymorphism, or with producers and scroungers so that
all three strategies are maintained in the population.
Innates will be retained in the population only if the fit-
nesses of the other strategies are not greater than theirs,
which entails that the population size will not be increased
by the presence of producers or scroungers. This occurs
when the gains in productivity brought about by adap-
tation are exactly offset by the loss of resources resulting
from the expression of maladaptations, with the result
that cultural practices and transmission are neutral with
respect to their effects on equilibrium population size.
Neither producers nor scroungers bring an advantage or
disadvantage to the population.
The second way in which adding maladaptations
affects the coevolutionary dynamics is that they may
cause periodic cycling of strategies and demographic
variables for a large range of parameter values (figure 2).
Cycling may occur in our model with all three types of
strategies in the population, and it may result in sharp
oscillations of population size, above and below the
value attained by a population of innates. In the presence
of cycling, cultural innovations and transmission bring
periodic advantages and disadvantages to the population,
possibly placing it at risk of extinction. The presence of
scroungers sometimes amplifies these oscillations, so
they can be seen as fitness disrupters in these cases.
(c) Learning and macroeconomic models
Our formalization is related to two distinct previous mod-
elling approaches. First, it has features in common with
previous models on the evolution of individual and
social learning (e.g. Rogers 1988; Stephens 1991;
Boyd & Richerson 1995; Wakano et al. 2004; Enquist &
Ghirlanda 2007). Such models usually assume fluctuating
environments to which individual learners can adapt by
trial-and-error learning or insight. Social learners are
then assumed to copy individual learners without paying
the cost of individual learning (analogous to our
parameter ci, and which can be thought of as the ‘cost of
plasticity’). This can result in either a stable or a cyclic
polymorphism between the strategies in the population.
As in our model, individual learners can be seen as produ-
cers (inventing new behaviours) and social learners as
scroungers (copying the new behaviours), so that the
basic underlying game structure in these classical models
is similar to ours. The crucial difference is that we do
not invoke exogenous environmental fluctuations, but con-
sider explicitly the cumulative aspect of culture. That is,
producers (individual learners) produce adaptive
technology and maladaptations that accumulate over
generations so that the environment (stock of culture) is
endogenously determined. This defining feature of our
model may result in different qualitative outcomes
0
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Figure 2. (a–c) Dynamics of pt, qt, Nt, At and Mt in the pres-
ence of maladaptations, x ¼ 0.1, and cost to maladaptations,
cM ¼ 1. Parameter values are a ¼ 3, h ¼ 0.001, eA ¼ 0.1,
eM ¼ 0.01, m ¼ 2, wA ¼ 0.1, wM ¼ 0.1, bA ¼ 0.025, bM ¼
0.02, zi ¼ zs ¼ 0.05 and ci ¼ 0. The initial values are those
given in figure 1. Besides the addition of scroungers, the
only difference between the parameters values in this figure
and those of figure S4 in the electronic supplementary
material is the presence of density dependence affecting the
rates of innovations (wA. 0 and wM. 0). All dynamical vari-
ables approach a stable periodic cycle regardless of the initial
mixture of innates, producers and scroungers in the population.
However, removing scroungers under these parameter values
would reduce the amplitude of the oscillations. As can be
seen in the figure, the oscillations tend to dampen after the
invasion of producers (from t ¼ 1000 to t ¼ 1500), and the
population approaches a stable cycle ifwe set q0 ¼ 0 (no scroun-
gers) for all initial mixtures of innates and producers. But
scroungers tend to amplify the oscillations: after they invade
(t ) 1500), the oscillations of Nt, At and Mt increase and
reach a higher amplitude than those owing to producers.
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concerning the coexistence of social and individual lear-
ners from those obtained in previous formalizations. In
particular, in previous work, social learners are not selected
in the absence of costs to individual learning (e.g. ci ¼ 0,
zi ¼ zs) because they have the same fitness as producers
in that case. In our model, by contrast, social learners
may still be favoured by selection as they can aggregate
adaptive cultural traits from different individuals, so that
when rare they may have higher fitness than producers.
Second, because we formalized the cumulative aspect
of technology and maladaptations explicitly, our model
has features in common with models from economics
such as those traditionally employed in macroeconomics
to study economic growth (e.g. Solow 1956; Kremer
1993; Galor & Weil 2000; De La Croix & Michel 2002;
Romer 2006). These models often take into account the
cumulative aspect of technology and its feedback on
demography. Technology (in combination with other fac-
tors of production) then affects the output of individuals
and/or their vital rates, in the same way as, or in a more
refined way than, we considered in our fitness functions
(equations (2.2) and (2.3)). Our formalization thus pro-
vides a link between such models and those of cultural
transmission. This could be further expanded by taking
into account geographical and age structure, as these
two features affect both the evolution of populations
(e.g. Wright 1931; Charlesworth 1980; Rousset 2004)
and economic growth dynamics (e.g. De La Croix &
Michel 2002; Romer 2006).
(d) Implications and outlook
Although our model is based on a series of simplifying
assumptions, the general qualitative features seem robust
to changes in functional forms, which suggests two main
implications of our results. First, our results suggest
broader conditions for selection on individual and social
learning than the constraint of fluctuating environments
emphasized previously (e.g. Rogers 1988; Stephens 1991;
Boyd & Richerson 1995; Wakano et al. 2004; Enquist
et al. 2007). Indeed, these strategies may also evolve
under a stable exogenous environment if individual lear-
ners (producers) generate a stock of adaptive cultural
traits, which can be interpreted as being an endogenously
determined environment. With the environment (or part
of it) being an endogenous dynamical variable, the effect
of social learning (scroungers) on fitness is changed. Our
results show that the coevolution of producers and scroun-
gers may then result in a wide variety of dynamics, in which
selection-driven cultural innovation and transmission
evolve to be advantageous (increase in carrying capacity)
or detrimental (decrease in carrying capacity) to the popu-
lation. From a theoretical point of view, our analysis thus
singles out unrecognized conditions for the evolution of
individual and social learning, and where cultural inno-
vation and transmission can increase population size.
There is a set of parameter values where this process results
in infinite population size (e.g. equations (3.2) and (3.3));
that is, in a ‘demo-cultural explosion’ (Ghirlanda &
Enquist 2007).
Second, taking the dynamics of maladaptations expli-
citly into account, and observing that not all aspects of
culture are beneficial to population growth (Kaplan &
Lancaster 1999; Richerson & Boyd 2005, chapter 5;
Enquist & Ghirlanda 2007), led us to identify feedbacks
on population demography that generate cycling under
a large set of parameter values. In a stochastic world,
this could mean an increase in the extinction probability
of the population, which might be of empirical relevance
for understanding the rise and fall of populations owing to
endogenous factors. As exemplified by the massive diver-
sion of natural resources to ceremonial construction on
Easter Island, which is linked to the final collapse of
this society, maladaptations are likely to affect population
demography (Tainter 1988; Diamond 2005). Impor-
tantly, cycling occurs in our model as an outcome of
the evolutionary dynamics because it is selection-driven
(figure 2), and is made possible by cultural
maladaptations being a by-product of the production of
cultural adaptations. Modelling maladaptations as a
fraction of the innovations that are not adaptive (see
equation (2.16); see also Enquist & Ghirlanda 2007)
seems a plausible assumption; in the biological context,
it is well known that most novel genetic mutations are
deleterious (Eyre-Walker & Keightley 2007). This
suggests that population extinction owing to the accumu-
lation of cultural maladaptations might have been a
recurrent phenomenon, not the consequence of some
local contingency, unless selective filtering of cultural
traits was strong (Enquist & Ghirlanda 2007). Our results
thus support quantitatively the view that maladaptations
may have repeatedly affected human demographic history
(Tainter 1988; Diamond 2005) and suggest that, as
cultural transmission and innovation became more
prevalent, local extinctions may have increased.
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1Electronic supplementary material to the paper by Lehmann and Feldman 2009“Coevolu-
tion of adaptive technology, maladaptive culture, and population size in a producer-scrounger
game”. Proc. R. Soc. Lond.
There are three appendixes (A1 to A3) followed by four figures (S1 to S4) in this sup-
plement.
A.1. Numerical results for unequal producing and scroung-
ing times and fitness costs
In the sub-section“Adaptations without maladaptations”of the“Results”section in the main
text, we presented analytical results with equal investment into producing and scrounging
(zi = zs = z) and no cost to individual learning (ci = 0). Here, we relax these assumptions.
If we assume that the proportion of time spent producing adaptive technology is diﬀerent
from that spent scrounging it (zi ￿= zs), the analysis becomes more complicated and we
present only numerical results for this case. When zs > zi, we observe that pˆ decreases as zs
increases while zi is held constant (Fig. S1). But Nˆ and Aˆ behave in the opposite way with
both increasing as zs increases while zi is held constant (Fig. S1). Consequently, increased
scrounging has the potential to increase the average level of adaptations and population size
(Fig. S2). This occurs because the more time that scroungers spend scrounging, the more
they aggregate adaptations from diﬀerent producers (see the second term on the right hand
side of eq. 2.11 of the main text), thereby raising the average stock of adaptations in the
population (which varies directly with zs). This, in turn, increases the amount of adaptive
technology that both producers and scroungers inherit from the parental generation (eq. 2.10
and eq. 2.11 of the main text), and the rate of innovation when IA,t > 0 (eq. 2.12). Hence,
when zs > zi, scrounging increases carrying-capacity. By contrast, when zs < zi, we observe
that pˆ increases as zs decreases while zi is held constant, but the equilibrium values Nˆ and
Aˆ are reduced instead of increased (Fig. S1).
2The main eﬀect of introducing a fitness cost to being a producer relative to being a
scrounger (ci > 0) is that it decreases pˆ (Fig. S3), which decreases the equilibrium stock
of adaptive technology, and consequently Nˆ . In contrast to the case where there is no
cost to producers, the equilibrium values Nˆ and Aˆ will now be aﬀected by introducing
scroungers into the population even for zs = zi. The presence of scroungers actually decreases
both Nˆ and Aˆ, everything else being constant (Fig. S3). Hence, under these conditions
when producers bear a fitness cost relative to scroungers, scrounging decreases the carrying-
capacity.
A.2. Multiplicative eﬀects on fitness
When fitness costs and benefits combine multiplicatively, but everything else is the same,
eq. 2.2 and eq. 2.3 of the main text are replaced by
wi,t =
α(1 +Ai,t)(1− zi)(1− cMMi,t)(1− ci)
1 + ηNt
, (A-1)
and
ws,t =
α(1 +As,t)(1− zs)(1− cMMs,t)
1 + ηNt
. (A-2)
We checked with numerical analysis that with these fitness functions the critical qualitative
results reported in the main text are not altered. That is, when zi = zs = z, ci = 0,
ϕA = ϕM = 0, and ￿A = ￿M = ￿, scroungers do not aﬀect the equilibrium population
size, which is illustrated in the additive case by eqs. 3.6–3.9 of the main text, and that when
these equalities are not satisfied, periodic cycling of the strategies and demographic variables
occurs under a large set of parameters values with ￿M > ￿A or ϕM > ϕA.
3A.3. Producer-scrounger equilibrium for unequal trans-
mission rates
When βM ￿= βT, but everything else is the same, eqs. 3.6–3.9 are replaced by
Nˆ =
1
η
￿
α(1− z){￿+ zµ(1− x)}
￿+ αcMzµx
− 1
￿
, (A-3)
Aˆ =
pˆzµ(1− x)(1 + zβT(1− pˆ)Nˆ)
￿
, (A-4)
Mˆ =
pˆzµx(1 + zβM(1− pˆ)Nˆ)
￿
, (A-5)
and
pˆ =
1
zNˆ
￿
x(1 + ηNˆ)cM − (1− x)(1− z)
x(1 + ηNˆ)cMβM − (1− x)(1− z)βT
￿
. (A-6)
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Figure S1: Equilibrium values pˆ, Nˆ , Aˆ graphed as functions of the fraction zs of time that
scroungers spend scrounging, while holding constant the fraction zi of time producers spend
producing. Parameter values are the same as those in Fig. 1 of the main text except that zs
varies while zi = 0.05 is held constant. To gauge the eﬀect on Nˆ and Aˆ of letting zs vary, the
horizontal lines in the second and third panel give the values of Nˆ and Aˆ for zi = zs = 0.05
(see Fig. 1). When zs > zi the equilibrium values of both Nˆ and Aˆ increase, while for zs < zi
the equilibrium values of both Nˆ and Aˆ decrease.
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Figure S2: Dynamics of pt, qt, Nt and At when scroungers spend more time scrounging than
producers do producing (zs > zi). Here zs = 0.1 and zi = 0.05 while the other parameter val-
ues are the same as those in Fig. 1 of the main text. As was the case in Fig. 1, producers first
invade the population of innates, and go to quasi fixation, which is followed by population
size and adaptive technology reaching a steady state. Scroungers subsequently invade the
population of producers. However, after the invasion of scroungers, the equilibrium values
Nˆ and Aˆ are now larger than they were before the invasion of scroungers. Scroungers bring
an advantage to the population.
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Figure S3: Equilibrium values pˆ, Nˆ , Aˆ as functions of the fitness cost ci to producers.
Other parameter values are the same as those in Fig. 1 of the main text. The top curves
in the second and third panels represent the situation where there are no scroungers in the
population (pˆ = 1), and thus represent benchmarks against which the eﬀect on carrying-
capacity of including scroungers can be assessed. The lower curves in the second and third
panels represents the situation where there are scroungers in the population, and show that
in the presence of fitness costs to producers, adding scroungers decreases the values of both
Nˆ and Aˆ. This diﬀers qualitatively feature from the case where there is no intrinsic cost to
producers (eqs. 3.3–3.4 of the main text). We mention that for the value of the cost where
the frequency of producers is zero, Nˆ is lower than in a population of innates, which stems
from the fact that scroungers do no spend all their time in labor, and the population would
thus be invaded by innates.
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Figure S4: Dynamics of producers in the absence of scroungers (q0 = 0); and Nt, At and Mt
in the presence of maladaptations, x = 0.1, and cost to maladaptations, cM = 1. Parameter
values are α = 3, η = 0.001, ￿A = 0.1, ￿M = 0.01, µ = 2, ϕA = 0, ϕM = 0, zi = 0.05, and
ci = 0, otherwise the initial values are those given in Fig. 1 of the main text. Producers invade
a population of innates. In so doing, they first increase the level of adaptive technology, and
subsequently that of maladaptations. The dynamics of all variables then oscillate to finally
settle in stable periodic cycles, which are reached regardless of the initial mixture of innates
and producers in the population (no chaos was observed).
